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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890459-CA 
v. : 
ERNEST ROBERT MILLER, : Category No- 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of distribution of a 
counterfeit substance, a second degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986). The conviction 
resulted from a jury trial in the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
the Honorable J. Phillip Eves, Judge, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The sole issue on appeal is whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following provisions are pertinent to resolution of 
the issues on appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (Supp. 1989)t 
Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, 
it is unlawful for any person to knowingly 
and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense; 
or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance 
in the course of his business as a sales 
representative of a manufacturer or 
distributor of substances listed in 
Schedules II through V except under an 
order or prescription; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or 
counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute, 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule 
I or II is guilty of a second degree 
felony and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty 
of a first degree felony . . . [.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(5) (Supp. 1987)t 
"Counterfeit substance" means: 
(a) any substance or container or labeling 
of any substance that without authorization 
bears the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, number, device, or 
any likeness of them, of a manufacturer, 
distributor, or dispenser other than the 
person or persons who in fact manufactured, 
distributed, or dispensed the substance which 
falsely purports to be a controlled substance 
distributed by, any other manufacturer, 
distributor, or dispenser; or 
(b) any substance that is represented to 
be a controlled substance. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ernest Robert Miller, was charged with 
distribution of a counterfeit substance, a second degree felony, 
under Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989). On May 
12, 1989, a jury found him guilty as charged. Defendant was 
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sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
Execution of the sentence was stayed and defendant was placed on 
three years probation. As a condition of probation defendant 
served 15 days in the Iron County Jail and was ordered to comply 
with other specified probation terms. Defendant filed his notice 
of appeal on July 20, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of July 20, 1988, Patrick McCarthy, a 
\ narcotics agent for the State of Utah, entered the Sportmen's Bar 
in Cedar City, Utah, for the purpose of conducting a narcotics 
investigation (T. 43). There, by prearrangement, he met a 
confidential informant and subsequently approached defendant, 
asking if defendant knew anybody in the bar who could procure 
some "speed," a slang term for the controlled substance 
amphetamine (T. 44-45, 47). Defendant replied that he did not 
know anybody at the moment but that he would check around. 
Approximately 15 minutes later defendant returned and said to 
Agent McCarthy, "I can get you some speed, but all I have are 
some cross tops, and they're my own, and they're at my house, and 
I can't get them for you until after the bar closes." (T. 47-48). 
After the bar closed, at approximately 1:00 a.m., July 
21, 1988, Agent McCarthy and the confidential informant followed 
defendant to defendant's home where defendant gave them 
approximately ten double-scored white tablets. Defendant did not 
charge Agent 'McCarthy for the pills but said that he could sell 
Agent McCarthy more at a cost of $20 for 200 (T. 49-51). 
Agent McCarthy submitted the pills he had received from 
defendant to the Utah State Crime Lab for identification, and it 
was determined that they contained no controlled substances. 
Defendant subsequently was arrested and charged with distribution 
of a counterfeit substance. 
At trial Agent McCarthy, who had had 12 years of 
experience as a narcotics officer in California and 16 months in 
narcotics in Utah, testified concerning the practice of using 
slang terms to describe illicit drugs (T. 40, 53-55). In the 
200-300 cases he had worked on involving "speed," the term, when 
referring to a substance in tablets form, meant an amphetamine. 
Other terms used to describe a tablet form of amphetamine were 
"cross tops" and "go fasts." (T. 46, 47, 52). Agent McCarthy 
further testified that in his experience the non-controlled 
substances ephedrine, pseudoephedrine and caffeine were described 
as "speed" only if the person offering such substances was trying 
to sell a phony or counterfeit product as an amphetamine (T. 51, 
52). Agent McCarthy also stated that the price quoted to him by 
defendant for the purchase of more cross top tablets, 200 for 
$20, was a fair price for amphetamines (T. 51). 
Kevin Lee Smith, the Utah State Criminologist who 
analyzed the tablets received from defendant, testified that when 
he receives a white scored tablet for analysis, he checks for 
amphetamine. He stated that ••[i]f there is going to be a 
controlled substance in a white scored tablet, it's going to be 
amphetamine. In one case, I found a barbituate in a white 
double-scored tablet, but that's an exception" (T. 95, 96). Mr. 
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Smith's analysis of the tablets in question indicated that they 
contained only ephedrine, a non-controlled substance. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Applying the applicable standards of review, there was 
sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of 
distribution of a counterfeit substance. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
CONVICT DEFENDANT OF DISTRIBUTION OF A 
COUNTERFEIT SUBSTANCE. 
Defendant argues that evidence submitted by the State 
at trial was insufficient to support a conviction of distribution 
of a counterfeit substance under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1986) 
on the grounds that: (1) the use of slang terms to describe 
specifically defined substances is inexact and confusing, and (2) 
the statute governing the distribution of counterfeit substances 
is unconstitutionally vague. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established the standard of 
appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence needed to support 
a jury verdict in a criminal case. In State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985), the Court stated: 
[W]e review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses . . . . M . . . 
So long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. . . . 
(citations omitted). See also State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26, 30 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
At trial the State presented two expert witnesses, Utah 
State Narcotics Agent Patrick McCarthy and Utah State 
Criminologist Kevin Lee Smith. They testified to the use, 
terminology and identification of controlled substances, in 
particular the substance amphetamine. 
Agent McCarthy, a 13 year veteran of narcotics 
enforcement, testified to the prevailing street use of slang 
terms to describe controlled substances over use of their 
designated pharmaceutical names. He unambiguously stated that 
the terms "speed" and "cross tops," as used in his conversation 
with defendant and in other drug transactions, referred to the 
substance amphetamine. Defendant argues that Agent McCarthy 
testified that the terms "speed" and "cross tops" are 
diametrically opposed. That assertion is not supported by the 
record. The portion of the transcript in question reads a 
follows: 
A. [Agent McCarthy] . . . He [referring to 
defendant] didn't state to me, "I don't have 
any speed, but I have some cross tops." What 
he stated was, "I have some cross tops at my 
hotise that are my own personal ones, but it 
has to be after the bar closes." 
Q. [Defendant's Counsel] But you're sure he 
didn't say, "I don't have any speed, but I do 
have some cross-tops." 
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A. [Agent McCarthy] I know he didn't say 
that because that would have stuck in my 
mind. To me, those are diametrically opposed 
terms. 
(T. 62, 63). Read in context, it is clear that Agent McCarthy 
meant that referring to "speed" and "cross tops" as different 
substances would have stuck in his mind, that such identification 
was diametrically opposed to his understanding of the meaning of 
those terms. As corroboration for his understanding that his 
transaction with defendant involved amphetamines, Agent McCarthy 
testified that defendant's quoted price of $20 for 200 (or $10 
for 100) more tablets was a fair price for amphetamines and 
indicated to him that defendant was offering amphetamines (T. 
51). Agent McCarthy's testimony concerning his conversations 
with defendant and use of slang terminology was consistent and 
clear throughout his examination at trial. 
State Criminologist Kevin Lee Smith's testimony that if 
a controlled substance appeared in a double scored tablet it 
would be amphetamine compliments Agent McCarthy's testimony. 
Agent McCarthy believed that his transaction with defendant 
involved the controlled substance amphetamine by virtue of 
terminology used and the physical appearance of the procured 
tablets. Mr. Smith confirmed that the physical appearance of the 
tablets could lead one to believe that an amphetamine was 
present. 
The fact that the jury was persuaded by Agent 
McCarthy's testimony and found defendant guilty of distribution 
of a counterfeit substance carries great weight. As noted supra, 
an appellate court in this state will substitute its own judgment 
for that of the jury "only when the evidence . . . is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345. In the instant case, the evidence 
presented fell well within the Utah Supreme Court standard and 
was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. 
Defendant also argues that the statute(s) governing 
distribution of a counterfeit substance might be constitutionally 
suspect. However, defendant admits that he can find no support 
for a constitutional challenge to the statute(s) in question. 
Defendant cites State v. Moore, 674 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1984), a 
Colorado case that upheld the constitutionality of that state's 
statute governing controlled substances, in support of that 
position. Although the Colorado statute in question is 
sufficiently dissimilar to the Utah statute to make any 
meaningful comparison of the two untenable, the State agrees with 
defendant that a constitutional attack on Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8 (1986) or § 58-37-2(5) (Supp. 1987) (defendant never specifies 
which statute might be constitutionally suspect) cannot be 
supported. There appear to be no Utah cases attacking the 
constitutionality of either statute applicable to the instant 
case. However, the Utah Supreme Court has established standards 
for reviewing the constitutionality of any statute. In Trade 
Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 436-37, 446 
P.2d 958, 961-62 (1968), the Court held that a statute must 
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wclearly violate some constitutional provision, and further, the 
violation must be clear, complete and unmistakable" and that in 
examining statutory constitutionality the court must apply every 
reasonable presumption favoring constitutionality in deference to 
legislative prerogative to enact law. See also State v. Tolman, 
775 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, P.2d 
(Utah Oct. 24, 1989). Moreover, the "party attacking the 
constitutionality of a statute must affirmatively demonstrate its 
unconstitutionality." Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 
P.2d 184, 191 (Utah 1984). See also Tolman, 775 P.2d at 425. 
Defendant's failure to meet his burden of affirmatively 
demonstrating the statute's unconstitutionality, coupled with 
this Court's deference to legislative prerogative, undermines 
defendant's challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm 
defendant's conviction of distribution of a counterfeit 
substance. 
DATED this ' - "" day of December, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
^IjUAhfilClt't'lTirvJ 
v^JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON 
assistant Attorney General r 
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